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an important issue for Lithuanian energy security, and for Lithuanian national security as well. Nowadays Lithuania is far too dependent on energy supply from Russia, not to mention the fact that currently Russia is pursuing a policy of exports expansion and is trying to increase the dependence of Lithuania and all the European Union (EU) on energy imports from Russia. This paper will analyze the influence of energy security on national security, and particularly the impact of the state"s energy policy on national security. Also, the Lithuanian law on energy, international treaties which could influence Lithuania"s energy policy, and EU restrictions on the state"s energy policy will be assessed. An analysis of Lithuania"s dependence on energy and energy resources supply from foreign countries will be undertaken, as well as Russia"s energy interests in Lithuania, and how Russia uses energy supply as a lever in its bilateral relations.
Finally, analysis of the challenges and prospects of integrating Lithuania"s energy sector into the Western energy sector will be provided. The paper will culminate with some conclusions and recommendations.
LITHUANIAN ENERGY SECURITY: LITHUANIA"S DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY
SUPPLY FROM RUSSIA Economic interdependence and particularly dependence on the supply of energy resources often creates problems for the economic and general security of the state.
Therefore it is more and more often claimed that the nature of national security and the specifics of threats are changing, with new types of threats emerging alongside traditional military threats. Influenced by globalization, more and more often the world speaks about threats of economic conflicts, economic dependence and others 1 . In order to survive and prosper, a state must ensure permanent access to energy supplies, the essential economic conditions of survival as well as of economic growth. Economic growth is one of the major conditions guaranteeing the economic security of a state.
Russian academician L.I. Abalkin states that "economic security is the totality of circumstances and factors which ensure independence, stability, and capacity of consistent renewal of the national economy" 2 . Thus awareness of economic threats and their assessment must be carried out very thoroughly. Nowadays the concept of energy security is treated very diversely. Most often energy security is comprehended as an aspiration to ensure the energy needs of various energy consumers, to protect the economic interests of the community and the state from internal and external threats. In the National Energy Strategy, prepared by the Lithuanian Energy Institute, the energy security of a country is defined in the following way:
Energy security -the whole complex of the State"s actions and measures which secure the degree that fuel and energy services are available to ensure conditions for the stable economic development and protection of national welfare as well as minimization of risks associated with supply and use of fuel and energy services. To preserve national interests, reduce the country"s vulnerability to pressures and threats, energy security in a wider sense includes energy supply, economic, technological, environmental, social and cultural dimensions 3 .
As we can see from this definition, energy security must be analyzed taking into consideration its complexity. Therefore the Lithuanian National Energy Strategy defines the content of energy security as the totality of various conditions 4 . However, dependence on energy supplies is one of the crucial conditions ensuring the economic and energy security of Lithuania. For Lithuania, as well as other countries importing energy resources, the main criterion of energy security is "supply security", i.e. the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices
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. In order to ensure energy security it is required to have a variety of various energy resource suppliers from various countries. Thus, in case of energy resource disruption from one country, the lack can be compensated from another. The Lithuanian National Energy Strategy affirms that one of the major factors influencing stable energy activity in Lithuania is the domination of Russia in the sphere of primary energy resources import to Lithuania, as well as the dependence of gas and electricity supply systems on the energy systems of Russia and absence of energy systems and junctures with Western Europe 6 . Meanwhile, the countries exporting energy resources emphasize "safe demand", i.e. guarantees of a long-term demand under pre-arranged conditions, as well as control of the state power and political monopolies on energy resources, export pipelines and distribution networks 7
. We can observe how Russia is implementing this kind of concept, concentrating exporting power, narrowing competition terms and consolidating its monopolistic position while exporting energy resources to Lithuania. Thus, there is an obvious contraposition between Lithuania as an importing country and Russia as an exporting country, which definitely aggravates the political and economic dialogue between the countries. The above described situation when Lithuania becomes dependent on energy resources supply from one country accelerates the necessity to diversify energy supply and search for opportunities to expand the variety of energy resources supply 8 . In order to ensure its energy security Lithuania obviously needs to carry out a well considered and balanced energy policy involving political, economic and technical aspects.
Various legal documents of the Republic of Lithuania highlight the issues of energy security guarantees. The Lithuanian National Security Law asserts that energy supply is one of the essential factors strategically important for the national security. In the same law the government of Lithuania is obliged to provide for the development of alternative energy sectors (sustainability of atomic energy among them) and to ensure supply of resources which are independent from monopolistic suppliers and essential for national security. The law also maintains that provision with energy resources cannot be given to the control of the subjects from the supplying countries. These provisions of the law attempt to prevent the domination of Russian energy companies in the energy economy of Lithuania, at the same time projecting preferences for the arrival of Western companies" investments into the Lithuanian energy sector 9 .
Another strategic document defining the issues of Lithuanian energy security is the Lithuanian National Security Strategy. This document determines the core goals and measures of national security policy. It includes political, defense, economic, and other spheres of activity. Energy sector security, as a sphere of economic activity, is very precisely defined in this document. One of the primary interests, without protection of which the vital interests of Lithuania could be violated, is ensuring supply sources of strategically important raw materials and alternative energy, as well as development of strategically important regional infrastructure objects 10 .
The above mentioned document also lists the risk factors, dangers, and threats for the national security of Lithuania, the most important being excessively high dependence on strategic resources and energy supply from one country. Among the economic factors which can threaten national security, citizens" welfare, the independence of the country or its constitutional system is the takeover of property management control in strategically important economy sectors with the goal of impairing economic security. In this case companies in the energy sector are claimed to be one of the fundamentally important contributors to national security
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. Besides, it is easy to notice that while emphasizing dependence on strategic raw material and energy supply from one country, the document in fact acknowledges the dependence of the effectively neutralize or compensate for the threats due to the dependence on energy supply from Russia or to reduce their damage, simultaneously using all acceptable ways to reduce dependence. This strategy asserts that Lithuania will try to achieve greater energy security on three levels: the European Union, regional, and national. On the national level it is planned to solve the issues of primary energy resources development and energy resources balance. On the regional level it is planned to support partnership and cooperation, which would facilitate a common regional security approach. On the EU level Lithuania will try to see that the common Baltic (Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian) energy security issue is solved in a complex way, as a guarantee of competitiveness and energy security Having analyzed the Lithuanian strategic documents by which the energy sector is defined, it is possible to notice two problematic aspects which attract most of the attention. Firstly, the Lithuanian energy dependence on Russia is emphasized, as well as the threats to Lithuanian energy and national security, arising from this factor.
Secondly, a goal to integrate into the EU energy systems is clearly defined, in order to diversify energy resources, thus reducing the influence of Russia.
The common EU energy policy is of vital importance for Lithuania. In . This is important while speaking about projects like Nord Stream, which are looked at with distrust not only with regard to environmental aspects, but also violate the solidarity principle of the EU member states -when one of the participating EU countries violates energy security interests of other member states.
Projects such as Nord Stream should conform to EU internal market rules, including the rules regulating the entrance of third parties into the market. Even with some delay, the above mentioned document can prevent similar agreements, at the same time improving conditions ensuring energy security for member states.
Lithuanian Energy Security in the Background of Russian Geo-Energy Interests
Russian interests in Lithuania should be treated with regard to the geo-strategic interests of this country. Therefore, in order to understand the main interests of Russia in Lithuania, as well as in Central and Eastern Europe, it is necessary to evaluate the historical aspect of the relationships of these countries with Russia and the changing distribution of power and influence in the international system. Taking advantage of the changing situation, Russia tries to retrieve its former influence both in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe. "Moscow appears to be reemphasizing its 1990s era "red line" in terms of maintaining its "privileged role" in the affairs of former Soviet states" 19 .
It is also easy to notice that one of the basic strategic interests of Russia is to reduce the influence of the USA in Europe. Therefore in all possible ways it creates international policy combinations which eventually would serve this purpose. Despite the fact that Russia was not very successful in strengthening its power and influence using traditional political and diplomatic means, recently Moscow has had an excellent insight into the inner weaknesses of East European countries and the whole continent, especially the ones related to the economic and energy dependence on Russia. Russian security policy appears to be betting heavily on resource nationalism in order to strengthen Russia's "benevolent" control of gas supplies throughout the Central and East European gas markets -the ultimate goal of which is the neutralization of the role played by these countries within NATO, along with the unending struggle to increase the profits for Kremlin-friendly Russian companies 21 .
This statement demonstrates that with regard to Lithuania Russia can simultaneously carry out another kind of action, which would threaten Lithuania, but would be beneficial to Russia. Lithuania, as a member state of the EU and NATO and being totally dependent on Russian energy resources, can be turned into a certain "influence agent" in these organizations. In organizations like NATO, where decisions are made in the way of total agreement, the Lithuanian political elite can face difficulties in case of openly declaring a position which is not favorable for Russia. It is obvious that Russia tries to influence Lithuania, in the same way as other countries in the zone of its geo-political interests, through energy export and resource transit. The present tendencies suggest that in the future Lithuania can become even more dependent on the conditions dictated by Russia in the energy sector. One of the solutions to this problem would be the formulation and implementation of the unified EU policy on secure energy resource supply. However, Lithuania must find alternative energy and energy resource supply sources and reduce the dependence on Russia in the gas, oil and electricity sectors, without waiting for solutions and guarantees in the energy security sector from elsewhere.
Modeling the Lithuanian Energy Security According to Basic Energy Sectors
The Gas Sector and Its Diversification. Nowadays it is obvious that in the general context of Lithuania energy security the gas sector is the most vulnerable. The present gas pipeline system is not joined with Western European networks and has its only junction from Russia through Belarus, as well as a branch of the pipeline going from Lithuania to Kaliningrad Oblast (RF).It is therefore possible to claim that Lithuania does not have possibilities to take part in gas transit or to choose alternative gas supply sources and participate in the activity of the gas exchange. Consequently, the Russian monopolist Gazprom can dictate its conditions not only for the amount of the supplied gas, but also the prices. The structure of the natural gas market has been unchanged for a number of years and Lithuania imports gas from only one supplier -the Russian gas monopolist Gazprom. According to the long term gas supply agreements, natural gas is bought by two main Lithuania suppliers, Lietuvos dujos and Dujotekana, which provide consumers with more than 99 percent of the gas sold in Lithuania. It is essential to note that 99 percent of the liquid gas is supplied by the company Lietuvos dujos Possibly the greatest concern for Lithuania is the joint Russian/German pipeline project Nord Stream. It is a 1224-km-long natural gas transportation system via the Baltic Sea from Vyborg (Russia) to Greifswald (Germany). The system is due to start functioning in 2011 using one branch of the pipeline with the capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum. According to this project it is planned to build the second branch of the pipeline by 2012, which would increase the capacity up to 55 billion cubic meters per year. The pipeline will supply natural gas to the Netherlands, UK, Denmark, Belgium, France, and other countries 35 . It is easy to notice both the political and economic interests of the countries involved in this project. The interests of Germany are more pragmatic and economic, though not reflecting the common EU policy. As for Russia, political and geo-political interests dominate. The main shareholder of this project is Gazprom, who owns 51percent of shares 36 . This gas monopolist serves the purposes of Russian political and economic power and assists the Kremlin in playing a significant geo-political role. While implementing this project Russia aims at bypassing the Baltic States and Poland, thus eliminating them from Russian gas transit. In the future the Kremlin will have the possibility to use gas export to the above mentioned countries as a means of blackmail in order to achieve its political and economic goals, because if Russia turns off the "gas tap" for disobedient neighbors, the Western countries will not be affected. Kaliningrad Oblast will not feel any negative effect either, because a branch of Nord Stream to Kaliningrad will be built 37 .
While analyzing the possibility to diversify gas supply and consequently reduce dependence on one supplier, most specialists and the government of the country note three main alternatives. The first is construction of the liquid gas terminal, which would be one of the best and fastest alternatives solving this problem. Secondly, joining of Lithuanian and Polish gas pipeline systems is an option. Thirdly, a natural gas reservoir should be built. Finally, gas supply and transit activities should be separated 38 .
In July 2010 the Lithuanian Government, in order to implement its energy independence strategy, made a decision to build a liquid gas terminal in Klaipeda with the capacity of 3 billion cubic meters per year Implementation of the above mentioned projects indicates that a serious step has been taken towards having an independent gas sector and integrating the Lithuanian gas sector into European systems. That would enable Lithuania to strengthen its energy security and ensure more favorable terms to negotiate prices of raw materials.
The Electricity Sector -Nuclear Energy and Joining Western European Systems.
The Lithuanian electricity sector can be analyzed having in mind two periods. The first, lasting until the closing of the Ignalina Power Station, can be described as the most . Due to the absence of networks between Lithuanian and European energy systems Lithuania has to import natural gas, as well as the lacking electricity, from Russia, thus increasing dependence.
Taking into consideration the fact that the Kremlin uses energy as a means to achieve its political goals, the threat to Lithuanian energy and national security has considerably increased. Entering the common EU electricity market has become one of the essential goals of the Lithuanian government.
In order to increase the strategic reliability of energy supply and energy security, Sweden and Poland are of extreme importance as they will extend the electricity market, providing an alternative to Russian electricity.
Conclusion
The research reveals that dependence of the Lithuanian energy sector on Russian energy resources is really considerable. Fourteen years after the restoration of independence in 1990 Lithuania has managed to integrate its economy into the economies of Western countries and to strengthen its defense potential by becoming a member of NATO. Unfortunately, even today the complete integration of Lithuanian energy sectors into the Russian energy sector controlled by the Kremlin threatens national security and influences the country"s foreign and security policy. It is also unprofitable economically.
It is essential to note that the importance of energy security has always been emphasized in Lithuania"s main strategic security documents. The primary energy sector development goals are integration into the Western energy sector and regional cooperation in the energy sphere, as well as ensuring alternative supply of energy resources and raw materials. However, the research reveals that due to a variety of reasons the goals set about a decade ago have not been implemented or have been implemented only partially. The Butinge Oil Terminal can serve as a positive example as its operation guarantees uninterrupted import and export of oil and its products.
Implementation of this project ensured an alternative for oil supply from Russia, making this sector less vulnerable. This is the reason why in this paper I analyzed the oil sector separately. Unfortunately, this does not refer to the gas and electricity sectors. Due to the fact that the earlier goals and objectives of the Lithuanian government were not implemented, as well as Russia"s interests and actions, the above mentioned sectors have become even more vulnerable and dependent. The first factor diminishing the country"s energy security is the absence of electricity network links with the EU electricity networks after the shutdown of the Ignalina power station. Owing to this Lithuania was forced to buy the deficient electricity from Russia and other Eastern neighbors controlled by the Kremlin. The second factor is that Lithuania is still in the initial stage of implementing the project for a liquid gas terminal. Without such a terminal Lithuania is not able to accumulate the necessary amount of gas in the event of supply disruption from the only supplier Gazprom. The third factor is the absence of a gas link with Poland. The two latter factors can be used by the Kremlin as a means of achieving its political goals. Last but not least, the fourth factor is the Nord Stream project, which can be used by Russia in order to "cut off" Lithuania from any access to natural gas.
The four above mentioned factors prove that it is fundamentally important for Lithuania, together with its partners, to build the liquid gas terminal, establish electricity links with Poland and Sweden, and natural gas pipeline connection with pipelines of
Poland. In addition, as a long-term project, building a new nuclear power plant is essentially important. To sum up, implementation of these projects, as well as introduction of the common EU energy policy and the active participation of the EU in the dialogue with Russia in order to protect its members" interests, can ensure the energy security of Lithuania, at the same time strengthening its national security.
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